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INTRODUCTION
In the last ten years of our “information age,” the workload of the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has grown dramatically, increasing from 238,850 utility-patent applications in 1998 to over 460,000 in
1
2008. The flood of recent applications has thrust this previously obscure agency into the spotlight. The PTO faces an unenviable task.
The volume of patent applications is obviously extremely large. At the
same time, evaluating whether a patent should be granted is often a
2
highly complex endeavor. Proper evaluation requires understanding
not only the science in the area in which the patent is sought but also
3
the manner in which the patent statute applies to the science. The
patent statute itself sets out only a relatively skeletal set of standards
4
regarding how patentability should be determined.

1

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REFISCAL YEAR 2008, at 116 tbl.2, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/annual/2008/2008annualreport.pdf [hereinafter PTO, PAR REPORT].
2
Because of the technical complexity of the task involved, the analogy made by
Professors Abramowicz and Duffy to the Post Office, see Michael Abramowicz & John F.
Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1541 (2009), is not entirely apposite. Even the analogy to the Social Security Administration understates the technical complexity involved. See id. at 1558-64.
3
See Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially Neutral Patent
Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 1053-56 (2008) (discussing how scientifically oriented patentability standards promote the goal of innovation).
To be sure, the diligence with which this complex task is performed might vary depending on the patent application. For discussions of alternative application tracks,
such as accelerated and deferred examination, see infra notes 44-46, 109 and accompanying text.
4
For example, the nonobviousness requirement for securing a patent gives substantial discretion to the decision maker applying the requirement:
PORT,

A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). Moreover, recent case law from the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the Court views nonobviousness and other patent determinations to
be standards rather than rules. See Rai, supra note 3, at 1038-39. In contrast, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has tended to take a more formalist approach. See,
e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1102-03 (2003) (criticizing the formalist approach to
patent law then being taken by the Federal Circuit and concluding that a standardsbased approach is both formally and functionally justified); John R. Thomas, Formalism
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For all of these reasons, one might expect Congress to have established a highly muscular patent agency. This has not happened. Not
only does the PTO lack substantive rulemaking authority, but the
PTO’s reviewing court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
does not give any formal deference to legal decisions made by the
5
agency in its statutorily authorized case-by-case adjudication.
Even in the face of all of these obstacles, the PTO has had some
success in reforming substantive law in a manner that gives it more
power in the decision-making process. The courts appear to have accepted, at least implicitly, the PTO’s argument that these substantive
reforms will help the agency manage its workload and improve the
6
7
quality of the patents that it issues. In the 2005 case In re Fisher, the
PTO succeeded in convincing the Federal Circuit of the validity of its
heightened standard for evaluating the utility of patent applications.
As a consequence, patentees cannot file applications until they have a
8
“specific” and “substantial” use for their inventions. In 2006, the
PTO worked with the Justice Department’s Office of the Solicitor
General to shape Supreme Court interest in and reform of the core
9
patentability standard of nonobviousness. The result was the Su-

at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774-75 (2003) (disapproving of the Federal
Circuit’s formalist approach).
5
See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 293-301 (2007) (discussing
the Federal Circuit’s failure to give either Chevron or Skidmore deference to the legal
determinations that the PTO makes in individual patent cases).
6
Whether the PTO is correct in its views is ultimately an empirical question. Given
the recent vintage of these cases, an empirical verdict cannot yet be rendered. But the
argument that, relative to the prior state of affairs, the new case law will result in efficiency and quality improvements is not implausible on its face.
7
421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
8
See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097 ( Jan. 5, 2001).
9
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), the PTO and the
Office of the Solicitor General filed an influential amicus brief opposing the Federal
Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (TSM) requirement for proving nonobviousness. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1624, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2006/3mer/1ami/2004-1350.mer.ami.pdf. The PTO and the
Solicitor General were also heavily involved with the effort to persuade the Supreme
Court to take the case in the first instance. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (No. 04-1350), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/2pet/6invit/2004-1350.pet.ami.inv.pdf. At least in certain cases, the Federal Circuit had interpreted the TSM requirement to mean that, in
situations where several prior art references had to be combined to show nonobviousness, the patent examiner (or challenger, if the patent had already been granted) was
required to identify written documentation suggesting that the references should be
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10

preme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
which has made it easier for the PTO to deny arguably “obvious” patents. In October 2008, the PTO was successful in leveraging the
threat of Supreme Court intervention on the issue of patentable sub11
ject matter to secure from the Federal Circuit an en banc decision,
In re Bilski, upholding the PTO policy of excluding from patentability
12
processes that are not tied to a physical transformation or machine.
Most recently, the PTO was able to rely on KSR and an earlier Su13
preme Court decision, Dickinson v. Zurko, which mandated significant deference to factual findings made by the PTO in the context of
patent denials, to secure an April 2009 Federal Circuit victory with respect to the PTO’s application of nonobviousness to DNA-sequence
14
claims.
In addition, for the first time, the PTO will soon have in-house
professional economic assistance to help it make decisions about substantive examination criteria. As one of its final moves, the George W.
Bush administration spearheaded the establishment of an Office of
15
the Chief Economist within the PTO Director’s Office.
If filled
properly, with a respected economist who is perceived as being objective, this Chief Economist position could serve as an institutional locus
for data-driven thinking about how the patent law’s legal standards
could best serve innovation-policy goals. Moreover, because the position is set up under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), it
could attract academic economists in the same manner as similar posi16
tions at the FTC and the FCC. While these somewhat jury-rigged

combined. The briefs filed by the PTO and the Solicitor General focused on the significant burdens that a TSM requirement placed on patent examiners.
10
127 S. Ct. 1727.
11
In the recent case of Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories,
Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006), the Supreme Court originally granted certiorari to address
the issue of patentable subject matter. Notably, the Court itself raised the issue, even
though it had not been argued below. Although the Court ultimately dismissed the
certiorari petition as improvidently granted, three Justices dissented from the Court’s
decision. In the view of Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens, the issue was highly compelling and had been adequately briefed. Id. at 2921-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12
545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
13
527 U.S. 150 (1999).
14
In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
15
Job Announcement, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Chief Economist, Office
of the Under Secretary and Director (on file with author) (detailing the responsibilities of the Chief Economist).
16
5 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3376 (2006); see also INT’L TRADE ADMIN., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL ACT (IPA) FACT SHEET (2006), http://
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mechanisms to influence substantive patent law are hardly a substitute
17
for the power conferred by substantive rulemaking authority, they
nonetheless represent a significant win for the PTO.
By contrast, the PTO’s efforts to regulate the manner in which
patent applications are processed, where Congress has explicitly given
the PTO rulemaking authority under section 2(b)(2) of the Patent
18
Act, could be viewed as less successful. Perhaps most notably, the
PTO rules package that limits the number of “repeat” applications
patentees can file and places additional requirements on applications
that contain large numbers of claims was the subject of a sweeping ju19
dicial challenge that succeeded in the district court.
The district
court’s opinion in this litigation threatened to limit the PTO’s rulemaking authority on questions of procedure to relatively narrow concerns. Although the Federal Circuit’s March 2009 panel opinion in
20
the case takes a more expansive view of PTO authority, the opinion
includes a dissent and may not ultimately persuade the majority of the
Federal Circuit.
On first examination, then, it would appear that the agency has
enjoyed some success in areas where it has limited authority, and is
operating on tenuous ground in areas where it has been delegated
explicit authority. More generally, from the perspective of administrative law, the idea that an agency would have circumscribed control
over the manner in which it processes its workload is anomalous. An
important line of Supreme Court case law stresses that agencies are
generally in the best position to articulate their own procedural re21
quirements. And when the agency in question has over 9000 em-

www.ita.doc.gov/ooms/ohrm17.htm (discussing requirements of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, including the possibility of hiring from the academic sector).
17
While substantive rulemaking authority means that an agency makes substantive
“law” at the point that it promulgates a rule, the PTO must wait for a private party to
bring an appropriate test case and then wait for a decision by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit or even the Supreme Court.
18
35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2006) (stating that the PTO “may establish regulations” to
“govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office”).
19
See infra Section II.D (describing the district court’s decision in Tafas v. Dudas,
541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008), vacated in part sub nom. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), to strike down the PTO’s proposed rules).
20
Tafas, 559 F.3d 1345.
21
See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 525 (1978) (“[A]dministrative agencies and administrators will be familiar with
the industries which they regulate and will be in a better position than federal courts
or Congress itself to design procedural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the indus-

2056

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 2051

ployees (including over 6000 patent examiners), the need for significant managerial control would appear quite pressing.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, on second examination one sees more
complexity and nuance. The PTO faces a set of mutually reinforcing
challenges that substantially weaken its control over procedure. First,
even where reform does not directly involve external interest groups,
and thus is unlikely to be the subject of a court challenge, the PTO
has limited room for maneuvering. Most notably, the complexities of
collective bargaining with a union that represents over 6000 examiners pose a formidable challenge.
Once external interest groups get involved, the challenges grow
even larger. Because substance and procedure exist on a spectrum,
separated by no bright dividing line, the PTO’s lack of substantive
rulemaking authority makes it quite vulnerable to interest-group
charges that it has overstepped its bounds. Relatedly, as administrative law scholars have long discussed, any attempt to implement significant reform through rulemaking poses a challenge. Perhaps because of the PTO’s limited history with rulemaking, it has not shown
great aptitude in implementing the interest-group outreach that is often necessary (though hardly sufficient) to meet this challenge.
Moreover, although the PTO has procedural-rulemaking authority, it
has not been given fee-setting authority, an important concomitant
power for an agency with operations that are entirely fee based.
Finally, there is the anomaly of review by a court, the Federal Circuit, that itself can lay claim to specialization and expertise—two
characteristics that administrative law scholars typically see as the exclusive attributes of agencies. The Federal Circuit’s desire to formulate its own procedural rules for the PTO—perhaps most notably in
the area of inequitable conduct—substantially weakens the agency’s
ability to regulate interactions with applicants.
But the fact that anomalies can be explained does not mean that
they should persist. In the case of the PTO, ameliorating the difficult
situation is likely to require making it less of an outlier among administrative agencies. Although dramatic changes may be undesirable—
and are, in any event, likely to be politically infeasible—a few relatively
narrow tweaks affording the PTO some power over procedure could
22
produce significant improvements.

try and the tasks of the agency involved.” (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290
(1965))).
22
A caveat on the normative scope of this Article bears emphasis. Because transi-
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the evidence of
dysfunction and discusses the extent to which difficulties have
emerged as a consequence of both exogenous forces and problems in
substantive legal doctrine. As that Part notes, for better or for worse
(perhaps better in the case of substantive legal doctrine, worse in the
case of exogenous forces), both exogenous forces and substantive legal doctrine will, at least in the near term, be considerably different
than in the recent past. Part II discusses the area of procedure, where
little has changed in recent years. It elaborates on the factors, noted
above, that limit the PTO’s latitude in the area of procedure. Part III
outlines realistic near-term possibilities for the path forward, focusing
on ways in which the current trend toward tying the PTO more closely
to the administrative state in the area of substantive patent law could
be mirrored in the area of procedure.
I. CURRENT DYSFUNCTION: THE ROLE OF EXOGENOUS FORCES
AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Increased Workload and Backlog
In the last ten years, the PTO has been confronted with a significant
increase in numbers of patent applications. As noted earlier, the number of utility-patent filings nearly doubled between 1998 and 2008, going from about 239,000 in fiscal year (FY) 1998 to over 460,000 in FY
2008. 23 The George W. Bush administration, buoyed by a 2005 decision
by congressional appropriators to let the PTO retain all of the fees that
24
it charged, attempted to address this increasing workload by hiring
approximately 1200 new examiners each year in FY 2006 through FY

tion costs and political feasibility are key background considerations in the Article, it
does not purport to examine how an ideal system built from scratch would allocate
power between the PTO, Congress, and the courts.
23
PTO, PAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 116 tbl.2.
24
As discussed further below, the PTO is an entirely fee-funded organization.
However, it has not always been able to keep all of the fees that it collects. See infra
notes 48-52 and accompanying text. In the 1990s, for instance, Congress diverted
hundreds of millions of dollars in fee revenues from PTO coffers. See, e.g., Figueroa v.
United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 143 (2005) (analyzing a challenge to the constitutional
authority of Congress to divert fees in which the plaintiff asserted that $422.5 million
had been diverted); Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, PTO Fee Diversion Costs Jobs: Bar,
Industry United Against Diversion 1 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
intelprop/feediversion.pdf (estimating that “nearly $750 million dollars have been
withheld from the USPTO in the past decade”).
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25

2008. However, because examiner attrition rates were also high, net
growth in the workforce between the end of 2005 and the end of 2008
26
was only 1946 employees (about fifty-four percent of total hiring).
Additionally, end results did not improve. To the contrary, according to the PTO’s own statistics, the elapsed time before an applicant receives an initial response from the PTO increased from 21.1
27
months in 2005 to 25.6 months in 2008. At the end of FY 2008, the
28
PTO had not even begun review of over 770,000 applications. A total of 1,276,028 were listed as pending—that is, either awaiting initial
29
review or in the review process.
In the areas of information and communications technology
(ICT), delays were particularly acute. For example, in Technology
Center 2100, which covers computer architecture, software, and information security, the elapsed time before a first office action was
30.8 months; in Technology Center 2600, which covers communica30
tions, the elapsed time was 32.5 months.
Delays in patent examination can be a challenge for all firms seeking patents. However, such delays are particularly problematic for
31
startups that rely on issued patents to attract venture capital. To the
extent that startup-driven innovation will be an important component
of any plan to move the U.S. economy out of severe recession, addressing backlog should be a high priority.
Delays in patent examination can also adversely affect the ability
of cash-constrained startups to seek patent protection in other coun32
tries. Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), a U.S. applicant
can specify other countries in which it wants to preserve its U.S. filing
date but then delay the significant expense associated with actually
25

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT DATA UPDATE: FY 08, at 4 tbl. (on
file with author) [hereinafter PTO, PATENT DATA UPDATE] (stating that 1211 examiners were hired in 2008, 1215 in 2007, and 1193 in 2006).
26
Id. For a discussion of the problem of employee attrition, see infra notes 58-59
and accompanying text.
27
PTO, PAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 fig.
28
Id. at 118 tbl.5.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 118 tbl.4.
31
The empirical data indicate that most biotech firms that receive venture-capital
backing have issued patents. See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture
Capital, and Software Start-ups, 36 RES. POL’ Y 193, 197 (2007). Because the Mann and
Sager data are from the late 1990s, an era of robust venture-capital availability, it may
actually understate the desirability of patents for life-sciences firms seeking venturecapital funding.
32
Thanks to Steven Spinner for noting this point.
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prosecuting the application in those countries for as long as thirty
33
months. Thus, at least in theory, a firm that has filed a PCT application can save money by waiting to see whether the PTO thinks that the
invention is likely to be patentable before deciding whether to incur
the expense of seeking protection in other jurisdictions. But if there
are long delays before a patent is examined, the time window for seeking international protection may close.
Slow examination has not necessarily meant careful and deliberate examination. Given the large volume of applications, examiners
still have an average of only about twenty hours to examine applica34
tions.
Moreover, although patent-grant rates appear to have de35
creased somewhat over the last six years, it is not clear whether this
decrease targets “bad” patent applications (as the PTO argues) or
represents an across-the-board decision to reject patent applications
(as some patent applicants argue).
B. Causes: Exogenous and Endogenous
Some of the PTO’s increased workload can be traced to exogenous causes that would generally be considered positive. Perhaps
most notably, because the conceptual distance between basic and applied research in existing fields, such as biotechnology, is relatively
narrow, and because certain new fields, such as nanotechnology, have
immediate commercial application, a significant percentage of cur36
rent academic and industrial research is patentable.
Substantive patent law doctrine that developed in the 1990s has
also contributed to the growth in patent applications. This contribu33

Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 22, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S.
231. While the treaty originally provided for only a twenty-month period, that period
was subsequently increased to thirty months. See Revision of the Time Limit for National Stage Commencement in the United States for Patent Cooperation Treaty Applications, 67 Fed. Reg. 520, 520 ( Jan. 4, 2002) (providing notice of extension of the
time period by the World Intellectual Property Organization).
34
The precise amount of time available to an examiner depends on her General
Schedule (GS) pay grade and the technology center in which she works. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE
NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 7 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071102.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. For further
discussion of the examiner incentive and compensation system, see infra notes 53-54
and accompanying text.
35
See infra note 52.
36
See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289-91 (2003) (discussing the narrowing
of the conceptual gap between basic and applied research in the biomedical arena).

2060

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 2051

tion has arguably been less positive. The doctrine (overruled by KSR)
that patent examiners show documentary evidence of a prior art suggestion to combine or modify prior art references in order to use those
37
references to prove obviousness made it quite difficult for the PTO to
deny patent applications. Federal Circuit decisions expanding pat38
entable subject matter created an opportunity for the filing of large
39
numbers of patents with vague claims, particularly in the ICT area.
The patent-application figure achieved in 2008 may represent a
peak, at least in the short and medium term. Exogenous forces in the
form of a dramatically weakened economy (national and global) are
likely to contribute to a diminution in application filings, at least for
40
the short to medium term. The decisions in KSR and Bilski may also
lead to downward pressure on filings.
On the other hand, backlog and poor quality are linked not simply
to exogenous forces and substantive patent law but also to problems
falling on the procedural side of the substance versus procedure spectrum. Part II reviews these problems and presents five mutually reinforcing reasons why they may prove difficult to fix.
II. THE MANAGERIAL CONUNDRUM
A. The Current State of Play
From the perspective of efficient workflow management, the current U.S. system of patent filing and examination is quite peculiar.
The U.S. system is unique in allowing applicants who have been denied the coverage they seek to file “repeat” applications as many times
as they want. Repeat applications fall into two distinct categories:
41
continuations and requests for continued examination (RCEs). Although continuations can share the same priority filing date as their
37

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that, to establish patentable subject matter, an applicant need
only show that her invention is “useful”).
39
See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 9 (2008) (arguing that
because patent claims in the ICT industries fail to provide notice of patent boundaries,
both publicly traded and smaller firms in these industries incur large costs associated
with actual and potential infringement).
40
See Timothy K. Wilson, Patent Demand—A Simple Path to Patent Reform, 2 INT’L
IN-HOUSE COUNS. J. 806, 810 (2008) (indicating that, at least from 1982 onwards, GDP
growth and growth in patent filings have been highly correlated).
41
See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006) (continuations); id. § 132 (RCEs).
38
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“parent” application, they are technically considered new applications.
In contrast, RCEs represent continued examination of the same
application. Continuations also have a much longer history than
RCEs—continuations have existed for decades, while RCEs were only
42
established in 1999.
Notwithstanding these distinctions, the two types of repeat applications now tend to be used in similar ways. Both continuations and
RCEs are typically used to adjust the scope of the initial patent application so that it yields the patent, or set of patents, that is most commercially useful to the applicant. For at least certain segments of the
biopharmaceutical industry, continuations appear to serve as a
mechanism for claiming the particular molecule within a genus of
compounds that ultimately proves successful in clinical trials. 43 For all
applicants, continuations (though not RCEs) can serve as a mechanism for securing narrower coverage in an initial patent while holding
44
out for broader coverage in a continuation.
One might argue that an applicant determined to secure optimal
coverage (within the bounds of the relevant substantive patent law)
should be able to use repeat filings for that purpose. On this view, repeat filings would represent a second-best option when the first-best
option—either a fully reliable initial examination or the ability to defer examination pending a determination of precisely what claim
scope the applicant needs (or whether the applicant ultimately needs
patent protection at all)—is not available. For reasons discussed further below, the first-best option of a reliable initial examination may
not currently be available. Deferred examination is currently available
45
in limited form, but this limited form is suboptimal because appli42

RCEs were established as part of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, sec. 4403(2), § 132(b), 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-560 (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006)).
43
See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees GlaxoSmithKline at 8, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F.
Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (Nos. 07-1008, 07-0846).
44
Interestingly, although the biopharmaceutical industry is most adamant in opposing the limitations the PTO has attempted to place on continuation and RCE filing
(and is the lead plaintiff in the case challenging these limits), Technology Center
2100—computer architecture, software, and information security—currently receives
the most RCEs. In FY 2008, thirty-six percent of total filings in Technology Center
2100 were RCE filings. John J. Doll, Deputy Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual
Prop. and Deputy Dir. of the USPTO (Acting), U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Slide
Presentation: Patents Business Unit 17 (on file with author) [hereinafter John Doll,
Slide Presentation].
45
37 C.F.R. § 1.103(d) (2008); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 709 (8th ed., 7th rev. 2008) [hereinafter PTO, MPEP],
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep_e8r6_0700.pdf. Ap-
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cants have to determine at the outset the precise time period for
46
which they want to defer examination.
But even if repeat filings can be justified, we might expect that the
cost that any filing—repeat or, for that matter, initial—imposes on the
47
system would be borne by the applicant. This does not happen. As
noted, the PTO is an entirely fee-based organization. However, under
the current fee structure, a large percentage of the front-end examination cost is recouped through back-end issuance fees as well as
maintenance fees, which are considerably higher than front-end filing
48
fees. Specific numbers from recent years illustrate the magnitude of
the cross-subsidy. The PTO estimates that in fiscal years 2005 to 2008,
the average examination cost per patent has ranged between $3773
49
and $3961. By contrast, the initial filing fee, which is supposed to
cover filing, search, and examination, is $1090. Issuance fees are seventy-four percent higher ($1480), and maintenance fees (due at 3.5,
50
7.5, and 11.5 years) are $1020, $2320, and $3580, respectively.
Not only do applicants who secure and maintain patents dramatically subsidize those whose patents are denied, but the current fee
structure also sets up an obvious financial incentive for the PTO to
grant patents. The skewed incentive structure may be based on a policy
judgment that patent applications, even those that ultimately end up
being nonmeritorious, should be encouraged. Relatedly, it could be
based on the supposition that false positives, in the form of patent applications that are improperly granted, are better than false negatives,
in the form of patents that are not applied for in the first instance. But

plicants can also defer examination de facto in various ways. For example, they can
use the availability of a thirty-month delay under the PCT application process to defer
examination. The benefits of improving current methods for deferring examination
are well articulated in Steven Bennett & David Kappos, Deferred Examination: A Solution
Whose Time Has Come, IP WATCH, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2009/03/12/inside-views-deferred-examination-a-solution-whose-time-has-come. Notably, an improved system of deferred examination could in all likelihood be implemented through PTO regulation, so long as the PTO’s procedural-rulemaking authority is not interpreted in an unduly cramped fashion. See infra subsection III.A.1.
46
Bennett & Kappos, supra note 45.
47
As discussed further in the text, requiring appropriate payment for the filing of
patent applications may be particularly desirable to the extent that, even after they are
issued, patents impose significant deadweight loss and transaction costs. See infra Section II.C.
48
For FY 2008, maintenance fees were the PTO’s largest source of earned revenue. PTO, PAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 56 fig.
49
Id. at 43 fig.
50
Revision of Patent Fees for Fiscal Year 2009, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,534, 47,535 (Aug.
18, 2008) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g)).
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the case for such a policy judgment has not been made. Meanwhile,
the skewed structure creates additional patent applications that add to
backlog. Additionally, in contexts where quality concerns counsel in
favor of granting a relatively small percentage of applications, the struc52
ture creates the potential for significant revenue shortfalls.
On the examiner side of the equation, incentives are also peculiar.
The compensation system for examiners awards credits, or “counts,”
for only two specific actions taken during the examination period:
53
“first office actions” and “disposals.” The examiner receives a firstoffice-action count by making a preliminary communication to the
applicant as to whether the application is allowable (thereby permitting the applicant to amend claims as necessary or to contest the examiner’s conclusion). A variety of actions on the part of either the
examiner or the applicant can produce a disposal count. Such actions
include allowance of the application, abandonment (which can occur
not only when the applicant entirely drops an application but also
when she files a continuation), and an RCE.
Counts must be achieved within an allotted period of time that is
calculated based on the experience level of the examiner and on the
complexity of the technology at issue. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) explains that

51

Interestingly, some economists have argued against self-funding of patent offices on the grounds that such self-funding will cause offices to set initial application
fees too high. See Joshua S. Gans et al., Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices,
TOPICS IN THEORETICAL ECON., 2004, at 1. But these economists work within a line of
economic theory that assumes policymakers cannot measure the social value of invention, and therefore the socially optimal approach is to encourage the maximal number
of patent applications, grant such applications, and then cull ex post through renewal
fees. Id. at 1-3 (discussing theoretical literature). Under this line of theory, it is not
clear why a patent office (or litigation system) with validity criteria would exist in the
first instance. Any patent for which an entity was willing to pay renewal fees would be a
patent worth having from a social standpoint. Presumably this could include patents on
public domain information.
52
As noted earlier, in recent years the PTO has reduced the percentage of patents
that it grants during the first round of examination. See John Doll, Slide Presentation,
supra note 44, at 12 (showing an allowance rate of 44.2% in 2008, a drop from rates of
about 70% in 2002). Although the grant rate is higher once continuations and RCEs
are taken into account, a downward trend can be discerned. See Mark A. Lemley &
Bhaven Sampat, Essay, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 182-89
(2008) (discussing recent data, including figures regarding continuations and RCEs).
Of course, percentages tell us very little about whether the PTO grant rate is too high,
too low, or just right. This is particularly the case because patent scope can be modified substantially in prosecution. Indeed, a strong argument can be made that the
relevant concern is not grant rates, but appropriate incentive structures for both applicants and examiners.
53
GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 7.
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a GS-12 patent examiner working on data processing applications is expected to achieve two counts in 31.6 hours, whereas a GS-12 patent examiner working on plastic molding applications is expected to do so in
20.1 hours. In contrast, GS-7 examiners working on these two types of
applications are expected to achieve two counts in 45.1 and 28.7 hours,
54
respectively.
55

This production framework has not changed since 1976.
Various analysts have argued that the framework no longer reflects
56
the work required to consider patent applications. In certain cases,
as a consequence of improvements in automation of the prior art
search, the time allotted may be too high. In other cases, the increasing complexity of a particular scientific or technological area (and the
associated patent applications) creates a situation in which the time al57
lotted may be too small. The mismatch has an obvious impact on examiner morale. Indeed, the GAO report discussed above concluded
that high rates of patent-examiner attrition were largely a function of
58
overly demanding, or at least outdated, production goals. Attrition
creates inefficiencies for all organizations. For the PTO, however, the
inefficiency may be particularly costly—those who leave tend to do so
after only three to five years, precisely the point at which the PTO’s in59
vestment in training is beginning to pay off in terms of output.
The production framework may also create incentives for examiners to prolong patent examination by “forcing” repeat applications.
Specifically, to the extent that examiners determine that they cannot
do an adequate job in the time allotted for an examination, they can
use various tactics to encourage applicants to file continuations or RCE
applications. Even though examination of a continuation should be
easier since the examiner has seen the application before, examiners

54

Id.
Id. at 8.
56
See, e.g., id. at 5 (stating that sixty-seven percent of surveyed patent examiners
cited production goals as “among the primary reasons they would consider leaving the
USPTO”).
57
In general, the total number of claims per issued patent appears to have increased almost one-hundred percent since 1976. Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patent
Law Blog (Patently-O), Rising Claim Counts, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/
12/rising-claim-co.html (Dec. 23, 2007). Most of this increase has occurred in dependent claims. See Ron D. Katznelson, Bad Science in Search of “Bad” Patents, 17 FED.
CIR. B.J. 1, 26 fig.3 (2007) (reporting that the average number of total claims rose from
approximately fourteen in 1990 to twenty-four in 2002).
58
GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 5-6.
59
See id. at 5 (stating that seventy percent of those patent examiners who left the
PTO between 2002 and 2006 worked there for less than five years).
55
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receive the same amount of credit for conducting a first office action
on a continuation as on an original application. Meanwhile, as noted
earlier, continuations and RCEs also redound to the benefit of applicants, as they are subsidized for pursuit of optimal claim coverage.
As noted above (and discussed further below), the PTO’s attempt to
limit patentee use of repeat applications is currently the subject of litigation that threatens the agency’s power to manage its workload. A more
direct alternative, which would not have required rulemaking or perhaps
even negotiations with outside interest groups, might have been reform
of the scheme that establishes incentives and compensation for examiners. Indeed, at least two prominent reports issued in the last five years—
both the GAO report discussed above and a report by the Department of
60
Commerce’s Inspector General —have recommended such internal reforms. The next Section considers why such reform, though highly appealing in theory, may be difficult to achieve in practice.
B. Internal Reforms: Examiner Incentives and Prior Art Searching
Presumably, the goal of internal reform would be to ensure that,
at least on the examiner side, delaying behavior is not rewarded and
time allocated better corresponds to the time required for any given
application. But such complex recalibration may be difficult to implement in a work environment where the patent examiners’ union
tends to view management-proposed changes as attempts to squeeze
examiners further with respect to the time that they have to examine
61
applications.
Union resistance to management-proposed changes may also pose
an impediment to longstanding hopes that greater examination efficiency and quality could be achieved either through outsourcing prior
art searches or through reliance on the prior art searches of foreign
patent offices. Proponents of the outsourcing scenario argue that
separating the prior art search function from the examination function
could yield specialization-related efficiencies. Proponents of the inter-

60

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FINAL INSPECTION REPORT NO. IPE-15722, USPTO SHOULD REASSESS HOW EXAMINER GOALS, PERFORMANCE
APPRAISAL PLANS, AND THE AWARD SYSTEM STIMULATE AND REWARD EXAMINER PRODUCTION 30 (2004), available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/2004/USPTOIPE-15722-09-04.pdf.
61
See Press Release, Patent Office Prof’l Ass’n (POPA), Fixing the USPTO: Doing
the Job Right the First Time (Aug. 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter POPA, Fixing] (discussing the current “culture of conflict” at the PTO and stating that examiners
need more time to do their job correctly).
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national work-sharing scenario note the very significant inefficiency of
having U.S. examiners do prior art searches on the many foreign ap62
plications that another patent office has already searched thoroughly.
63
Although these arguments are compelling, realizing efficiencies
would require examiner assent to a reduction of counts achieved on
applications for which a prior art search has already been done. Such
assent may be difficult to achieve. Indeed, although the PTO has vig64
orously pursued various work-sharing programs with other offices, it
has not, at least thus far, attempted to translate this work sharing into
a restructuring of the count system.
Union arguments about examiner workload are buttressed by the
reality of high attrition rates among patent examiners. Particularly during times of economic growth (precisely the times when patent applica65
tions tend to grow), examiners often have lucrative alternative opportunities in the private sector. Thus, PTO management has limited
latitude to undertake change that makes (or is perceived as making)
additional demands on examiners. At a minimum, it cannot undertake
such change without offering significant compensatory benefits.
Compensatory benefits in the form of higher salaries or substantially improved information-technology tools (the informationtechnology infrastructure at the PTO is notoriously poor and better
66
tools are a prominent demand of the examiners’ union ) might be
possible. However, in order for such benefits to be offered, the PTO’s
budget would have to grow. At a minimum, the PTO would need
62

See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Stephen G. Kunin, Improving the Effectiveness of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, SCIENCE PROGRESS, Fall-Winter 2008/2009, at 72,
76, available at http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/01/improving-the-effectivenessof-uspto (noting the “debilitating redundancy” of the current patent search and examination system).
63
In the case of outsourcing, one could argue, however, that greater segmentation
might produce transaction costs that exceeded efficiencies. This argument parallels
the literature on the comparative advantages of markets and firms. See generally OLIVER
HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 5-6, 23-28 (1995) (explaining
how transaction costs compel a frequent user to seek ownership, thereby avoiding the
costs of ambiguous contracts).
64
See John Doll, Slide Presentation, supra note 44, at 39 (discussing implementation of pilot programs with the United Kingdom, the European Patent Office, and the
Korean Patent Office, as well as full implementation as of January 4, 2008, of work
sharing with the Japanese Patent Office).
65
In the last fifteen years, examiner attrition rates have been highest when the
economy is strongest. In FY 2000, for example, the attrition rate peaked at 13.77%. In
FY 1999, it was 12.52%. PTO, PATENT DATA UPDATE, supra note 25, at 4.
66
See POPA, Fixing, supra note 61 (stating the need for updates to the U.S. classification system so that examiners can find the best prior art).
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greater control over its budget. In contrast with the purely internal
reforms discussed thus far, reforms involving fees obviously require
some level of assent from external interest groups. The next Section
turns to the critical, but hotly contested, question of fees.
C. Limits on Authority over Fees
Although the PTO has authority to set a few fees by regulation,
any significant change in the major fees that it charges—filing fees,
issuance fees, and maintenance fees—currently requires congressional
67
action.
The generally modest pace of congressional action in the
patent arena does not afford the PTO the flexibility over fees that it
needs to manage its workload. In addition, although Congress has in
recent years allowed the PTO to keep all of its fees, the patent statute
currently requires that this decision be made annually by congres68
sional appropriators.
Patent-reform legislation proposed in the 111th Congress gives
the PTO authority to set most major fees so long as the “fee amounts
are set to reasonably compensate the Office for the services per69
formed.” Giving the PTO permanent regulatory power to impose on
applicants a “pay as you go” strategy and ensuring a permanent end to
fee diversion would be a significant improvement over the current system of cross-subsidy and year-by-year assessment of the fee-diversion
question. Such a system would stabilize the PTO’s budget and allow
for long-term planning.
Securing this regulatory power—or even a one-time fee restructuring—may prove difficult, however. For the last few years, legislation
on fees has been bundled with other, more contentious provisions
(perhaps most saliently, provisions concerning damages apportionment in litigated cases). Whether Congress would entertain fee legislation divorced from such highly contentious provisions is unclear. In
addition, even such stand-alone legislation would not necessarily pass
easily. For example, the February 2003 Strategic Plan for the PTO
announced by then-Director James Rogan would have raised and re67

See 35 U.S.C. § 41(d) (2006) (limiting the PTO’s discretion in setting fees to
minor issues such as “processing, services, or materials”).
68
Id. § 42(e).
69
S. 610, 111th Cong. § 9(a)(1) (2009). The legislation sets up a fairly elaborate
consultation-and-comment scheme that the PTO must follow before any fee change
can become effective. The PTO must consult with the Advisory Committees (the Patent Public Advisory Committee and the Trademark Public Advisory Committee) and
also seek comments from the general public and Congress.
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70

structured fees considerably. Various patent interest groups rebelled
against these proposed fee increases, and the PTO ultimately withdrew its request for legislation to implement the increases.
To be sure, in the case of the fee increases proposed by Director
Rogan, interest groups protested most vigorously provisions that
would have imposed claim fees that increased in a nonlinear fashion
for more than three independent claims and more than twenty total
71
claims. As the PTO admitted, this nonlinear escalation was not necessary to compensate the Office for services performed. This element
of the reform package (as well as certain other elements) took a good
idea with some political feasibility—fee increases and restructuring—
and expanded it into a proposal that was highly objectionable to interest groups. The efforts by Director Rogan suggested a lack of po72
litical sensitivity that would (as discussed further below ) be a persistent feature of the PTO’s reform agenda.
In fairness to the PTO, a fee structure that does more than “reasonably compensate” the PTO for services performed is not necessarily
a bad idea. Such a fee structure might be put into place to deter filing
behavior that imposes costs not only on the PTO but also on society as
a whole. Whether patents with large numbers of claims impose larger
social costs, however, is not clear. These large numbers of claims may
reflect an effort to seek appropriate patent scope against a background
law that imposes significant sanctions on applicants who file a small
73
number of broad claims that they are then asked to narrow.
A better use of fees to achieve deterrence might take aim at the
“patent portfolio” approaches used by many ICT firms. As has now
been well documented, ICT firms often amass large patent portfolios
on the grounds that they need defensive patents as protection against
70

See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 3
(2003) (“This strategic plan cannot succeed without . . . changing the USPTO’s current fee schedule and access to revenue generated . . . .” (italics omitted)).
71
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN: FEE
PROPOSAL COMPARISON CHART, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/
feeproposalcomparison.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (showing proposed charges).
72
See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (describing continuation and
claims rules).
73
The sanctions in question emerge from the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. Under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of this doctrine, patentees who narrow broad claims during prosecution in response to an examiner’s objection are severely limited in their ability to assert in subsequent litigation that a defendant
infringes by utilizing an invention substantially equivalent to the patented invention.
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1366-67
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
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74

lawsuits from their competitors. This strategy of mutually assured
75
destruction (MAD) appears to be socially wasteful, especially if one
takes into account the possibility that some of these ICT patents will
fall into the hands of nonpracticing entities that are not subject to the
logic of MAD and instead use the patents for holdup purposes.
Moving ICT firms away from the socially wasteful MAD strategy
represents a significant collective action problem, however. Moreover, increasing fees to a level that merely allowed for reasonable compensation for services performed is not likely to do enough to address
the collective-action problem. Although the data on the question are
limited, several recent studies have suggested that at low fee levels,
76
patent demand is relatively inelastic. In fact, an intellectual property
attorney at one of these large ICT firms recently argued that a filing
fee as high as $50,000 (applicable, he would suggest, only to large
77
firms) might be necessary to curb filing significantly.
Even for large firms, such a dramatic increase in filing fees would
be quite problematic. Moreover, imposing such a fee starting at the
first application would imply that all filing is an activity to be deterred.
This deterrence aim is squarely inconsistent with the standard argument that certain levels of patent protection are conducive to innovation for all firms, regardless of their size.
On the other hand, an argument can be made for some level of
taxation in connection with patent portfolios. In this regard, a system
under which firms were charged a slightly increased fee for each addi-

74

See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON.
101, 104 (2001) (documenting defensive patenting in the semiconductor industry); see
also Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small
Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45 (2004) (finding, based on a study of determinants of patent suits from 1978–1999, “that patentees with a large portfolio of patents to
trade . . . are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits”); Gideon Parchomovsky &
R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26-27, 36 (2005)(discussing defensive patent-portfolio behavior among ICT firms more generally).
75
The argument that the MAD strategy is not socially wasteful would have to rest
on the assumption that defensive patenting promotes interfirm exchanges of information that would not otherwise occur. However, there is little, if any, empirical evidence
that firms in the ICT industry actually read patent disclosures (or that these disclosures
provide useful information in any event).
76
See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 40, at 810-12 (arguing, based upon a model that uses
U.S. application and fee data over the last four decades, that filing fees need to be
raised significantly in order to reach the elastic portion of the demand curve).
77
Id. at 812 fig.5 (estimating that applications might fall to 100,000 if filing fees
were raised to $50,000).
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tional patent application they filed in any given year is an interesting
78
possibility.
A full discussion of the merits and demerits of such a “progressive”
fee system is beyond the scope of this Article. One obvious demerit is
that it creates the potential for gaming through the formation of shell
companies or other mechanisms. More generally, regulating behavior
through fees is likely to be a highly complex and politically sensitive
endeavor. For present purposes, the point that bears emphasis is that
such a structure would have (by far) the greatest impact on large
technology firms that file thousands of applications each year. In
2008, for example, virtually all of the firms that secured more than
79
500 patents were large technology firms.
One legal difficulty with PTO implementation of a fee structure
that was intended to tax applicant behavior, and not simply to compensate the PTO for examination costs, would be that Congress might
explicitly have to grant the PTO taxation authority. Although the Supreme Court has stated that agencies can be authorized by Congress
to impose taxes, it has also stated that if Congress wants to delegate its
80
taxation authority to an agency, it must do so explicitly.
On the
other hand, as discussed further in Part III, such authorization could
be part of a scheme in which Congress gives the PTO some level of authority over fee setting.
D. The Blurry Line Between Substance and Procedure
In lieu of a complex renegotiation of the incentive scheme for examiners that would have been constrained by a limited budget, and

78

I thank Bruce Sewell for this suggestion. In fact, even if the PTO’s goal were
simply to charge applicants for the cost that they imposed on the Office, charging an
increased fee for each additional application might be a plausible strategy. The available empirical evidence indicates that ICT firms that file significant numbers of patent
applications are more likely than other firms to shift the costs of searching for prior art
onto the PTO. See Juan Alcácer et al., Applicant and Examiner Citations in U.S. Patents: An
Overview and Analysis (Harvard Business School, Working Paper 09-016, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273016 (finding that the percentage of prior art citations
added by the examiner is highest in the ICT area and among “prolific patentees”).
79
See Press Release, Wolters Kluwer Health, IFI Patent Intelligence Analysis of
2008’s Top U.S.-Patent Recipients Suggests America May be Losing Dominance ( Jan.
14, 2009), available at http://www.ificlaims.com/IFIPatents010909.htm (listing the
“top 35” recipients of U.S. patents in 2008).
80
See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989) (“Congress must
indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary authority to
recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties . . . .”).

2009]

Growing Pains in the Administrative State

2071

having failed to secure reform in the area of fees that might have
helped the budgetary situation, the PTO chose a different path. The
path it chose was to promulgate rules that required applicants that
wanted to file more than two continuations (or continuations-in-part)
and one RCE to make a showing of good cause as to why they needed
81
another application. The PTO also required that, in cases where the
applicant was seeking more than five independent claims or twentyfive total claims, the applicant provide an “examination support
82
document” certifying the performance of a prior art search, identifying the prior art “references deemed most closely related to the sub83
ject matter of each of the claims,” and discussing “how each of the
84
independent claims is patentable over the cited references.” In Tafas v. Dudas, a 2008 decision, a district court struck down these rules as
“substantive rules that change existing law and alter the rights of ap85
plicants . . . .”
For administrative agencies with substantive rulemaking authority,
the issue of whether a rule is substantive or procedural typically arises
when an agency is seeking to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking
86
under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Under the APA, rules that are substantive (as opposed to procedural or
interpretive) usually require notice-and-comment rulemaking. Thus,
from the perspective of an agency that has substantive rulemaking authority, a court’s disagreement with its decision regarding the substance versus procedure distinction has a limited impact. Such a disagreement simply means that, if the agency is truly committed to the
rule, it will have to utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking.
In the case of the PTO, by contrast, the stakes are much higher.
Indeed, the district court opinion in Tafas v. Dudas would have eliminated the agency’s authority to make rules managing its workload in
any situation where a patent applicant could perceive those rules as
altering her rights in any significant manner.
To be sure, as discussed further below, there are legitimate reasons to believe the continuation and claims rules do not resolve the
81

37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2008).
Id. § 1.75(b)(1).
83
Id. § 1.265(a)(2).
84
Id. § 1.265(a)(4).
85
541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (E.D. Va. 2008).
86
See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing the distinction between procedural and substantive rules with regard to a Department of Health and Human Services peer review system).
82
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PTO’s problems. But in this case, judicial minimalism at the district
court—for example, striking down the rules on the ground of imper87
missible retroactivity —would have been preferable to a broad declaration that a rule’s alteration of the rights of a patent applicant ren88
ders that rule substantive.
At least for the moment, the district court’s sweeping interpretation has been overturned by a panel of the Federal Circuit. On appeal, Judge Prost, writing for the majority, invoked D.C. Circuit case
law to hold that a rule is not substantive within the meaning of section
553—and hence for purposes of the PTO’s authority—simply because
it “alter[s] the manner in which the parties present themselves or
89
their viewpoints to the agency.”
Although Judge Prost’s opinion has considerable merit, whether it
will ultimately persuade a majority of the Federal Circuit is open to
question. Another recent Federal Circuit panel opinion, Cooper Tech90
nologies v. Dudas, appears to follow the Tafas district court in emphasizing the effect on “individual rights and obligations” as a touchstone
91
Judge Rader’s dissent in Tafas would
of substantive rulemaking.
have affirmed the district court by emphasizing the approach taken in
Cooper Technologies. As a consequence, even after the panel decision in

87

Impermissible retroactivity is a ground advocated for in a Federal Circuit amicus
brief filed by the American Intellectual Property Law Association. See Brief for American Intellectual Property Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Tafas v.
Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (Nos. 07-1008, 07-0846). Even a determination that the rules were arbitrary and capricious as a policy matter would have had a
relatively limited impact.
88
A Federal Circuit amicus brief to which I contributed argued that the test used by
the district court is incorrect. Brief for Intellectual Property and Administrative Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (Nos. 07-1008, 070846). For further discussion of the law governing the distinction between procedure and
substance, see infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
89
Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
90
536 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
91
Id. at 1136 (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir.
1991)). The Tafas court distinguished Cooper Technologies by arguing that in Cooper Technologies the panel was deciding the meaning of substantive rules relative to interpretive
rules, not parsing the substance/procedure divide. Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1354-55. The Tafas
majority also argued, quite correctly, that a Supreme Court decision, Chrysler v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281 (1979), which noted in passing that substantive rules “affect[] individual
rights and obligations,” id. at 302, was not making a determination regarding the distinction between substance and procedure. Indeed, the Chrysler Court addressed the issue of
substance as a preliminary step in the context of a different inquiry—that of whether a
particular regulation should be deemed to have the “force and effect of law.” Id. at 301.
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Tafas, how the PTO should go about managing its caseload while remaining within the limits of the law is not entirely clear.
E. Negotiating Interest-Group Arguments
As administrative law scholars have long discussed, the availability
of pre-enforcement judicial review of regulation poses a challenge
even for well-established agencies like the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). One conservative estimate puts the percentage of
92
challenged EPA rulemakings at twenty-six percent.
As a consequence, according to some scholars, many agencies have reduced
93
their regulatory activity.
Administrative law scholars have scrambled to find mechanisms to
avert such litigation. One of the more prominent mechanisms is “negotiated rulemaking.” Under a negotiated-rulemaking scheme, all affected parties (including representatives from government, the private
sector, and nongovernmental organizations) are consulted prior to a
notice of proposed rulemaking. The hope is that a negotiatedrulemaking committee will reach agreement on a proposed rule. If
the committee reaches such an agreement, the agreement is then
94
used as the basis for the proposed rule. Congress formally author95
ized the practice by passing the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.
Unfortunately, however, the empirical evidence on whether this timeconsuming procedure achieves positive results—whether in terms of
96
keeping matters out of court or otherwise—is (at best) mixed.

92

Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
1111, 1129.
93
See id. at 1126-27 (“Administrative law scholars appear almost universally to accept that pre-enforcement judicial review of regulations at [the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)], as well as at other agencies, has led to a decline in
new regulations.”). Coglianese himself disagrees with this perspective, however. Id. at
1127, 1128 & fig.1 (charting a doubling of NHTSA’s cumulative pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations between 1976 and 1996).
94
See generally Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1982) (describing the process and aims of negotiated rulemaking).
95
Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–
570a (2006)).
96
See Coglianese, supra note 92, at 1131-36 (finding that negotiated rules were
challenged at the EPA at about the same rate as non-negotiated rules). Critics have
also argued that negotiated rulemaking distorts the proper role of an agency “first, by
reducing the agency to the level of a mere participant in the formulation of the rule,
and second, by essentially denying that the agency has any responsibility beyond giving
effect to the consensus achieved by the group.” William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your
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In the case of the PTO, the usual difficulties of addressing the arguments of interest groups may be exacerbated by the agency’s relative inexperience with the rulemaking process. Thus, the agency persisted in pushing for the continuation and claims rules even after it
modified the continuation portion of these rules in a manner that
substantially negated their effect. Specifically, by the time it issued the
final continuation rules, the PTO had liberalized them to allow for a
97
total of three additional applications as a matter of right. In contrast, the original proposed rules had allowed only one additional ap98
plication as a matter of right. The PTO’s own data suggested that,
because of this liberalization, the rules would affect only a small per99
centage of applications. At the same time, by deciding that the rules
would apply not only to future applications but also to already-filed applications—with respect to which applicants may (in reliance on the old
practice) have made irrevocable strategic decisions—the agency made
even this small effect a flashpoint. Indeed, although a number of ICT
firms and associations—including Apple, the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA), the Business Software Alliance,
Caterpillar, Cisco, eBay, IBM, and Intel—supported the original rules
that allowed only one additional application as of right, only the CCIA
100
supported the PTO in the judicial challenge to the rules.
F. Inequitable Conduct and the Federal Circuit
As noted, the continuation-and-claims-rules package contained a
requirement that unusually large applications contain an examination
support document (ESD) detailing the prior art and the manner in
Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL.
L. 55, 92 (1987).
97
37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(iv)(B) (2008).
98
See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,717-18 (Aug. 21, 2007) (codified in scattered sections of
37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (indicating the change from the proposed rule).
99
See id. at 46,718 (“Under the proposed changes, about eleven percent of the applications and requests for continued examination filed in fiscal year 2006 would have
required a justification, where under the changes being adopted in this final rule less
than three percent of the applications and requests for continued examination filed in
fiscal year 2006 would have required a justification.”).
100
For a separate empirical project on rulemaking by administrative agencies, my
coauthor and I collected and analyzed all of the comments filed in response to the original continuation and claims rules. This listing is taken from our analysis of those comments. See Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Interest Groups in the Rulemaking Process:
An Empirical Investigation (Dec. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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which the claimed invention is an improvement over the prior art.
To an administrative lawyer not steeped in the intricacies of patent
law, such a requirement—even as applied to all patents and not simply
to large ones—might appear unexceptional. Many applications for
benefits conferred by the government require the applicant to provide evidence in favor of its application. Indeed, in the case of the
Food and Drug Administration, pharmaceutical firms spend hundreds
of millions of dollars compiling the human clinical data necessary to
102
make their case.
To be sure, in the case of the patent system, portions of the patent
statute suggest that the burden of proving lack of patentability is on
the examiner. For example, the novelty provision of the patent statute provides that a person “shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the
103
invention [is anticipated by the prior art].”
In addition, courts, including the Federal Circuit, have held that the PTO has the initial
burden of proving lack of patentability. However, even assuming that
the PTO bears this burden with respect to all requirements of the patent statute (and not just novelty), the ESD requirement cannot fairly
be read to shift the legal burden of proving patentability onto the applicant. Rather, as the Federal Circuit opinion in Tafas v. Doll points
out, the ESD merely requires information production in certain cases.
In any event, in the case of the ESD, much of the opposition by interest groups appears to stem not from philosophical resistance to the
idea of providing information but from problematic Federal Circuit
case law that arguably punishes applicants who attempt to provide useful information and explanation about their patent applications. Applicants note, with some justification, that under current Federal Circuit law any explanation they volunteer during the examination
process may expose them to subsequent charges that they made a “material misrepresentation or omission” before the PTO. Even worse,
under current Federal Circuit case law, the sanction is a virtual death
penalty. If the defendant in an infringement action succeeds in prov-

101

See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (estimating that the development of a
new drug, including marketing approval, costs hundreds of millions of dollars).
103
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (emphasis added).
102
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ing such deception or “inequitable conduct” with respect to a single
104
patent claim, the entire patent can be rendered unenforceable.
Specifically, under the Federal Circuit’s somewhat inconsistent
and shifting precedent for inequitable conduct, there exist at least five
105
different tests of materiality, and information can be deemed mate106
rial under any of these tests.
In contrast, the PTO’s own definition
of what constitutes a material misrepresentation or omission is much
more circumspect. The PTO limits a finding of materiality to the
situation where the noncumulative information either establishes a
“prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim” or where the information is inconsistent with an argument that the applicant has made re107
garding patentability.
But the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held
that the PTO definition is merely a starting point for this thinking
about materiality—it is at best one of the many standards that appli108
cants must satisfy.
Concerns about inequitable conduct also appear to have chilled
the use of some promising mechanisms that the PTO has established
to “tier” patent applications so that applicants who are willing to provide more information get more in exchange. For example, under
the agency’s current procedure for accelerated examination, the applicant is promised a decision within one year if the application com109
plies with certain disclosure requirements.
On its face, one might
imagine that accelerated examination could be attractive to applicants
that deem their patents particularly important. However, in part because of concerns of inequitable conduct, these disclosure requirements are considered sufficiently onerous that relatively few appli-

104

See, e.g., Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362-63
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that if inequitable conduct is found, the patent is rendered
unenforceable).
105
See, e.g., Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314-16
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (describing the five standards).
106
Id. at 1316 (noting that the PTO’s newest standard did not replace the older
standards).
107
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2008).
108
Digital Control Inc., 437 F.3d at 1316.
109
See Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications To Make Special
and for Accelerated Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,323 ( June 26, 2006) (describing the
accelerated examination process); see also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Petition To
Make Special Under Accelerated Examination Program, http://www.uspto.gov/web/
forms/sb0028_fill.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (listing the conditions for receiving
accelerated-examination treatment).
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cants choose this option. Between 2006, when the program was initi110
ated, and October 10, 2008, only 2460 applications were filed.
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF INCREMENTAL REFORM
The obvious next question addresses the steps that should be
taken going forward. It is tempting for academics to propose fundamental changes to existing law that would create an ideal system. Although such proposals for an ideal system are by definition first-best,
they are daunting for policymakers to implement. At a minimum, the
transition costs associated with fundamental change create a situation
111
where proponents of such change bear a considerable burden.
Relative to more fundamental reform, incremental changes fare
well if they are more realistic and grant us much of what we want. In
what follows, I focus on some incremental options that would give the
PTO an appropriate level of control over caseload management.
Given the difficulties of securing congressional action—
particularly when Congress may be unwilling or unable to separate
relatively simple administrative reform from highly contentious issues
like damage awards in litigation—the judiciary is probably the more
promising venue for conferring such control. With respect to the
critical question of authority over fees, however, only Congress can
confer the requisite power upon the PTO. The PTO should thus work
to build the coalitions necessary to press Congress on relatively discrete legislation on fees.

110

PTO, PATENT DATA UPDATE, supra note 25, at 26 fig.
Thus, for example, although Abramowicz and Duffy’s proposal for multiple
bodies that would compete to perform the patent-search-and-evaluation function is
intriguing, a move of that sort may best be attempted after more incremental steps
have failed. Even a move to a government-owned corporation, long advocated as a
mechanism for avoiding some of the bureaucratic difficulties associated with government employment and procurement regulations, may be a step better attempted after
more incremental steps have failed. In addition to imposing substantial transition
costs, these options may also undermine the important role that a national patent office should play in helping the executive formulate innovation policy in the overall
public interest. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2008).
111
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A. What the Judiciary Can Do
1. Substance Versus Procedure
The highly controversial rules at issue in Tafas v. Doll make the
case a less-than-ideal platform for a Federal Circuit decision offering a
liberal interpretation of the PTO’s authority to manage its caseload.
Nonetheless, the liberal interpretation offered by the majority opinion
in the case is desirable. The category of “substance” should not encompass any circumstance where the rule in question could be seen as
altering applicant rights. Such a definition unduly constrains agencies, particularly an agency like the PTO that cannot afford to have
any significant effort it makes to address its enormous workflow problems subject to a claim that its actions are ultra vires.
The Federal Circuit opinion in Tafas correctly follows the approach of the D.C. Circuit, which has shifted its focus from asking
whether a given rule change has a “substantial impact” on parties’
rights to inquiring “more broadly” into whether the rule change em112
bodies a “substantive value judgment.”
The D.C. Circuit views its
“gradual move away from looking solely into the substantiality of the
impact [as] reflect[ing] a candid recognition that even unambigu113
ously procedural measures affect parties to some degree.”
Moreover, under D.C. Circuit case law, rules that impose time limits on applications are not substantive, even if they could be seen as embodying
a value judgment that applications exceeding the time limit are in
114
some way less worthy than those filed within the time limit.
To be sure, these D.C. Circuit cases parse the substance versus
procedure dichotomy in the context of whether an agency needs to
follow notice-and-comment rulemaking under section 553. As both
Judge Bryson’s concurrence and Judge Rader’s dissent in Tafas point
out, interpretations rendered in the section 553 context should not
necessarily dictate the scope of the PTO’s statutory rulemaking power.
Even so, for purposes of interpreting the relatively terse statutory language of the PTO’s organic statute, the D.C. Circuit cases provide
valuable guideposts. They also reflect the experience of a court that is
constantly exposed to the challenges faced by agencies with significant
workloads. Regardless, any difference in context does not suggest that
the PTO’s power should be any narrower than the D.C. Circuit case law
112
113
114

Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id.
Nat’l Whistleblower Ctr. v. NRC, 208 F.3d 256, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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on section 553 would suggest. As Judge Bryson’s concurrence in Tafas
properly notes, “Congress has not used the broadest available language in the statute that authorizes the PTO to engage in rulemaking,
115
but neither has it used the narrowest.”
2. Inequitable Conduct
The judiciary should also fix the anomaly of Federal Circuit case
law that sets up courts as the sole arbiters of what constitutes fraud on
116
the PTO and what the sanctions for such fraud should be.
In the
context of other agencies, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
agency itself should have the primary responsibility to police against
117
fraud in its administrative processes. Given this Supreme Court case
law, a strong argument can be made for the PTO taking the lead in reform of inequitable conduct. Moreover, because rulemaking in this
arena is properly regarded as procedural, and there is little if anything
in the patent statute that speaks directly to the question, it should be
118
subject to Chevron deference.
Indeed, even absent new rulemaking,
litigants could argue that the Federal Circuit must defer to the single,
relatively narrow standard of materiality articulated by the PTO in Rule
119
56.
The progress that could be achieved through inequitable-conduct
reform is difficult to overstate. With such reform, interactions with
applicants could be regulated in a much more rational manner. In
addition to accelerated examination, inequitable-conduct reform
could also create opportunities (where appropriate) for more intensive, on-the-record engagement between the examiner and the applicant. For example, in appropriate cases, on-the-record pre-first-officeaction interviews that obviate the need for multiple subsequent rounds
of negotiation between examiner and applicant might be possible.
115

Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Bryson, J., concurring).
See supra Section II.F.
117
See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001)
(noting this point in the context of the FDA). Interestingly, in that case the Court
noted that allowing “fraud-on-the-FDA claims” to be made in litigation would “cause
applicants to fear that their disclosures to the FDA, although deemed appropriate by
the Administration, will later be judged insufficient . . . . Applicants would then have
an incentive to submit a deluge of information that the Administration neither wants
nor needs, resulting in additional burdens . . . .” Id. at 351. Similarly, a common complaint on the part of the PTO is that certain applicants provide a plethora of prior art
references with little explanation of their relevance.
118
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
119
PTO, MPEP, supra note 45, app. R §1.56.
116
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More generally, inequitable-conduct reform would make the op120
121
tion of selecting faster or more rigorous examination significantly
more attractive. The appeal of a faster examination is obvious. More
rigorous examination may also be attractive to those applicants who
want to enforce their patents because, under default principles of administrative law, courts should give greater deference to rigorous ex122
aminations than they do to ordinary examination.
B. What Congress Must Do
As noted above, in order for a request for intervention by Congress to achieve traction quickly, it may be prudent to keep such a request narrow and divorced from the various litigation-stage controver123
sies that have stymied patent reform in prior Congresses.
The key
step Congress must take involves giving the PTO significantly greater
authority over fee setting. At a minimum, this fee-setting authority
should include the authority to recoup expenses incurred on behalf
of the applicant.
As a supplement to the authority to recoup expenses, Congress
could also consider granting the PTO some authority to use fees to
regulate applicant behavior. To protect against the possibility of the
PTO using this authority recklessly (and against nondelegation concerns), Congress could set out guidelines and criteria for the PTO.
Congress could also provide that this grant of authority be reviewed
periodically to determine whether it should be renewed.
Perhaps the most prudent course would be for Congress to direct
the PTO to do a study of mechanisms for employing user fees to regulate behavior. As a prelude to action on a controversial question, such
an approach is hardly unprecedented. For example, in patent-reform
legislation proposed in the 110th Congress, Congress included a provision directing the PTO to submit, within two years of the legisla-

120

See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text (discussing accelerated examination).
See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks To Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 770-75 (2002); Mark Lemley et al., What To Do About Bad Patents,
REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 12 (proposing that applicants that selected into
rigorous examination could get a stronger patent).
122
See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 5, at 273 (“In circumstances where rigorous
administrative proceedings are in place, the result would be significantly greater deference than the Federal Circuit currently gives.”).
123
Even the creation of a better postgrant administrative alternative to costly litigation, important as it is as a matter of the proper functioning of the patent system, see
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 5, at 320-28, might be kept separate.
121
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tion’s enactment, a report “on the operation of prior user rights in se124
lected countries in the industrialized world.”
CONCLUSION
Incremental reform that gives the PTO greater control over its
procedures and its budgetary outlook would move us a long way toward a more efficient system of patent examination. In our search for
a first-best system, such incremental possibilities should not be overlooked. Indeed, in the area of substantive patent law, incremental
movement toward a more administrative role for the PTO has been
the major story of the last ten years of patent reform.

124

See H.R. REP. NO. 110-319, at 6 (2007) (directing the PTO to submit a report
that examines how prior-user rights affect, inter alia, innovation rates and the ability of
start-up enterprises to attract venture capital).

